This piece explores the relationship between law and resistance in terms of the concept and practice of ‘naughtiness’. Naughtiness as a practice and way of being has been to some extent forgotten by legal and political theory, the discussion within this paper being one that hopes to bridge this gap and elucidate the experience of being naughty, distinct from and as a part of, the overarching category of disobedience that this collection of essays seeks to interrogate. According to Loizidou (2013), ‘The relationship of disobedience to resistance is not one of substituting the one for the other, and the relationship of law to anarchism is not one of contempt [...] Moreover such practices speak to us of a parallel life than the state oriented or market organised one’ (Loizidou 2013). This third space offers a dynamic interplay between the powerful daily touching of law in life, to the transgression of the political.

Within this space we find the works of beat poet and writer William Seward Burroughs (1914-1997), naughty in his life and in his art, but this disobedience rarely understood as a political or revolutionary critique despite the theme of rebellion running throughout his works. But is Burroughs naughty, and really, what does naughtiness mean? And if one is naughty does that
mean there is no political narrative that drives such naughtiness, it purely being based on a subjective and almost selfish moment in time? The placement of naughtiness within established political theories of civil disobedience and conscious objection will hope to explicate where naughtiness stands in relation to disobedience, and ultimately, in relation to the authority of law, elucidating the role of justification and forgiveness within both disobedience and naughtiness. Naughtiness, as a form of disobedience, is one that is forgivable, but is it justifiable in the sense of consciously objecting and does it have to involve breaking the law? To be naughty normally means to get away with something, it suggests the presence of law or a norm, that which needs to be subverted, and yet the law is unable to do anything as the perpetrator is purely being naughty. It is suggested that naughtiness is forgivable, but the most unforgivable at the same time, using Derrida, due to its apparent lack of outside justification; and yet this does not mean it is not a political act, performance or way of being. Because it is the most apolitical, in the same movement, it must therefore be the most political of acts and spaces.

Naughtiness will be considered in relation to the life and aesthetic writing processes of Burroughs, in a hope to explicate this ontological space between politics and law, law and disobedience, the limits between life, law and art. In line with this edited collection’s aim to problematise the concept and practice of disobedience through a contemporary prism (both in terms of ideas and events), Burroughs acts as a powerful meeting place for the aesthetic and the political, for law and resistance, through his works and the refractory web of his life. I will argue he offers us examples of political disobedience in terms of denying a duty to obey the law of the State at the same time as a deeply subjective and personal narrative of substance misuse and addiction – an obedience to the depravity of the event in alternative terms. In a sense, Burroughs’ naughtiness is concerned less with disobeying, and more with a fidelity to accede.
What this tells us about the ontology and practice of naughtiness denotes a temporal fixation, one that is shaped by the junctures of the third space and the ‘nothingness’ (*naught/nought*) it generates. Burroughs’ cut-up techniques and the ‘Interzone’ will be used as analogies for the way in which these spaces manifest themselves in his work.

First, Burroughs life will be introduced, followed by an explanation of naughtiness and what kind of naughtiness we are speaking of, with the works of Arendt, de la Boétie and Thoreau and their theories of political disobedience afterwards. The role of justification and forgiveness will be considered. The discussion will then move to Burroughs’ works in terms of his ‘cut-up’ technique and the role of The Interzone, the cut-up being the practice itself of naughtiness, and The Interzone as the space within which naughtiness resides. This temporality of naughtiness hopes to show the subjective nothingness of political disobedience, the source of law and resistance as extra-legal in an Arendtian sense, a way of *not*-being, aswell as the more overt practices of disobedience, in a display of *obedience* as much as *dissing*.

**Burroughs’ Life**

William S. Burroughs is best known as a writer for his now infamous ‘Naked Lunch’ (1959), aswell as his use of the ‘cut-up’ technique, first pioneered by artist Brion Gysin, in his writing and his avant-garde lifestyle. Burroughs was gay, and a writer who, amongst other things, was riddled with the physical effects of heroin and opiate addiction throughout the majority of his life. Despite that, he lived to the ripened age of 83, and died whilst still undergoing a course of methadone. He recounts his drug-taking in his writing with the familiar lucid drawl and clinical accuracy of a laboratory assistant. His raw, blank documentations of his experiences are
horrific enough to persuade anyone it would be a bad idea to partake in the same gritty rehearsals - ‘junk’ as he refers to it, describing the addicts as identifiable by their smell of decomposition, their thick air of suppuration. His personal life was thus surrounded by the law, in his terms, ‘agents’ and ‘pigeons’ (those selling heroin who were tipping off the police). Burroughs accidentally shot his common law wife Joan Vollmer dead whilst doing his William Tell act at a party, aiming to shoot a glass off her head and the bullet deflecting in the wrong direction. He got off charges of culpable homicide with the help of an expensive lawyer, hired by the reputation of his very wealthy family.

His life was cast with legal and illegal encounters, coming up against norms. Burroughs’ life coincided with the world of narcotic prohibition, his family already affected by the ‘Harrison Narcotics Act’ of 1914, with the suicide of his morphine dependent uncle, Horace Burroughs, after finding the criminalisation of his condition too much. The act was drafted as a tax measure to regulate the market, but it soon was interpreted as a law prohibiting the supply, and thus the illegally gained, possession of opiates, coca, and hemp-based drugs. Burroughs documents the state of Louisiana passing a law that criminalised addiction, and with the decision of the Narcotics Bureau to incarcerate addicts, Burroughs claimed the, ‘... real significance of these scandalous laws is political.’ He saw law-makers as gangsters, where, ‘... ethics become fugitives, sanity is branded madness, and the artist’s only option is total resistance’ (Burroughs in Grauerholz and Silverberg 1998: xvi). Even the paperback industry was under scrutiny of the law for publishing works like those of Burroughs’. A 1967 ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which among other things banned homosexuality as part of the constitution. These laws percolated through into his writing in his disquiet for control, his cut-up technique, and his descriptions of the ‘Interzone’.
And so he was deviant in life, as well as his writing. The melding of law and literature is reproduced clearly, the product and the process, as Burroughs’ life operates in the same manner as that of which he speaks through his writing. Burroughs within his writing and his haunted self, seems to exemplify a trickster character, a mythological figure that has appeared throughout the folk-tales and story-telling of many disparate cultures: The: ‘…Trickster is at one and the same time creator and destroyer, giver and negator, he who dupes others and who is always duped himself […] He possesses no values, moral or social, is at the mercy of his passions and appetites, yet through his actions all values come into being’ (Radin 1956: ix). His pages depict a rare achromic starchness, that offer a lack as much as he gives. Burroughs as trickster is Burroughs using himself as a siren for extreme life experiences, and the honesty of an account of life that existed outside of the mediocre. Burroughs as trickster, destroyed and then created, claiming the death of his wife as that which, ‘… brought me in contact with the invader, the Ugly Spirit, and manoeuvred me into a lifelong struggle, in which I have no choice except to write my way out’ (Burroughs in Grauerholz and Silverberg 1998: 94).

Thus Burroughs’ life was embroidered with law and resisting law. The legislating of morals, and the resultant creation of deviance weave in and out of his life narrative, and that which he shares on the page. He writes on drugs that were becoming illegal, he writes on being homosexual, which became illegal, his books were condemned and then adulated, he uses the law and gets off the murder of his wife, he tears apart the grammar of writing in order to limit power of normativity. In the trial testimony of the publication of ‘Junky: the Definitive Text on Junk’, his agent, Alan Ginsberg, had to prove that the publication was actually a book, and not junk in the unwanted product sense. And yet despite Burroughs’ seeming detachment from his
world, you know that here is a man that tranquilises himself due to the heaviness or overwhelmingness of his surroundings, and his vulnerability and sensitivity almost aches from the character Bill Lee, in ‘Queer’ specifically. This middle-aged gay misnomer, who falls in love with Allerton, a younger, experimental character whom considers Lee as someone he wouldn’t wish certain friends to know about. It is this aching that reaches out as an instance of the presence of a norm, and its expectations, and the way in which Lee does not fit these societal rules and anticipations.

Having introduced Burroughs and the role of law within his life, before moving on to the effects and affects of disobedience in light of his works, naughtiness and disobedience should first be introduced.

**Naughtiness**

What is naughtiness’? Definitions speak of misbehaviour, misdoing, wrongdoing and antonyms of goodness. When you are naughty, you are ‘up-to-no-good’. In Italian, the translation is ‘indiscipline’, the lack of obedience and discipline. In Spanish, it is ‘travesura’, to traverse, to turn upside down. In French it is just plain bad conduct. But is naughty really bad? It is undeniably a form of wilful disobedience, although altered somewhat from civil disobedience (discussed shortly). Naughtiness is often considered in terms of a sexual deviance, one of titillation and mild sexual indecency, but more often than not, naughtiness also relates to children and their playful disobedience. In the 14th century, ‘naughti’ incurred being ‘needy’, or having nothing, or indicating a nought, or lack (Skeat 2007: 323). The wickedness and moral
wrongness is attested from the 1520s. From the 1630s, it takes on its more mischievous form with which we are familiar with today (Skeat 2007: 323).

Naughtiness appears throughout literature in Shakespeare, the Bible, and even Monty Python. As we know from the film 'The Life of Brian': ‘He's not the Messiah - he's a very naughty boy.’ And so he is not something - he is certainly not the Messiah, and that which makes him that nought (which is being told off by your mother in front of a great deal of people), is behaving incorrectly in the eyes of someone else, or some form of authority. Within the books of James, naughtiness is wicked and evil and represents sinful existence and that from which one should seek redemption: ‘Wherefore lay apart all filthiness and superfluity of naughtiness, and receive with meekness the engrafted word, which is able to save your souls’. Shakespeare offers a dystopic vision of naughtiness in ‘The Merchant of Venice’, as Portia sees a light in the distance: ‘How far that little candle throws his beams! So shines a good deed in a naughty world’ (Shakespeare 2000: 102).

Naughtiness is arguably a quieter, clandestine form of disobedience, as opposed to acts of civil disobedience which may be distinguished from naughtiness through their publicity. Naughtiness can be seen as an experience of a ‘hidden transcript’ (Scott 1990), a space between the figure and the literalness, the liminal, connoting a hidden occurrence. Naughtiness, like other forms of rebellion, can be a performance, it is a seductive practice that manifests itself as play within a conscience and in a phenomenology of rebellion. ‘How can performance, in itself, be a utopian gesture?’ (Dolan, 2001: 455). There is a story of freedom within the performance of naughtiness - production, to produce, to create, poeisis; like a construct of legal anarchy, the
aporetic powers of naughtiness can be both creative and destructive. Goodrich’s assertion that hedonism is a source of law, resonates (Goodrich 2004: 509), as naughtiness can be as much about enjoying one’s self, as a form of play. Aesthesis, means noticing the world, naughtiness being an aesthetic disobedience allowing for subversive behaviour. The fallibility of authority can be revealed through the subversive critique of the naughty, the play and the humour. Speaking in the words of a counter-tyranny, Deleuze (1971: 76) claims in his accounts of sadomasochism that, ‘... irony and humour are the essential forms through which we apprehend the law. It is in their essential relation to the law that they acquire their function and significance.’ Accounts of play, and indeed a ‘playing with the law’, hint to naughtiness’ Agambian ‘being-beside’ the law (Agamben 2007: 49). Taking inspiration from Goodrich, as this subversive fabric that folds within and around naughtiness, it is a form of critique, and one that both embodies, and crosses a divide, as: ‘... satire introduces a novelty that is external to law[...]’ (Goodrich 2004: 427).

Having deciphered the origin, alternate meanings and critical possibilities of naughtiness, where does this sit in terms of the overarching concept and practice of disobedience? Disobedience should now be introduced in order to place naughtiness in relation to law and resistance, and thus to understand this in light of Burroughs’ life and works.

**Disobedience/Obedience**

There are plenty of accounts of disobedience from which any development of the thematic naughtiness can take from. ‘Dis’ means to set apart, to unravel, to deconstruct – ‘dis’secting.
'dis'repecting,' 'dis'sonance, 'dis'ease, 'dis'senting', 'dis'embodying, 'dis'membering. The focus of this collection of writings is to approach disobedience as concept and practice from a more contemporary angle than some of the descriptions and accounts of disobedience in the past, nevertheless, these past accounts underlie how we can seek to understand acts of defiance or deviance, and ultimately, naughtiness. According to Loizidou (2013), past writings on disobedience represented disobedience as a practice revealing the limits of political government, such as the accounts of Etienne de la Boétie at the time of the renaissance, and Henry David Thoreau during the 19th century. Disobedience is historically described as intrinsically linked to a politically motivated stance that seeks to alter or contribute towards the reform of a state and/or a law concerned. Thoreau describes all men as being those who know the propensity for revolution (1948: 284), simple living and civil disobedience as part of this means of reformation and rejuvenation in the face of an unjust state: ‘The mass of men serve the state thus, not as men mainly, but as machines, with their bodies’ (Thoreau 1948: 283). If there is a law or a demand led by the state that would cause a subject moral concern, then it is rightful and a duty to not accept such a law: ‘If (an injustice) is of such a nature that it requires you to be the agent of injustice to another, then, I say, break the law. Let your body be a counter friction to stop the machine’ (Thoreau 1948: 290). As far back as Socrates, the philosopher himself was known as a man who refused to adhere to unjust or futile laws, ‘who swallowed hemlock pursuant to an arbitrary Athenian decree rather than refuse obedience to the law of the city-state which had formed and protected him’ (Martin 1970: 1).

And yet these depictions of disobedience are somewhat inapplicable to what will be the following narratives of naughtiness in relation to Burroughs, arguably due to a number of factors. This is predominantly down to the literature focusing on civil disobedience, as opposed
to a disobedience that takes place on one’s own, quietly, subjectively. Civil disobedience can be defined in different ways. According to some, to be civil disobedient an act must be non-violent, otherwise the act itself would be uncivil. It must also be direct, whereby there must be a law broken and this law must be the one that is being objected to (Elliston 1982: 23). This highlights that the civil disobedience should be illegal, as otherwise there is a conceptual difficulty, as a legal act by definition would never qualify as disobedience (Elliston 1982: 23), and yet is this the case with all forms of disobedience? Can there be such a thing as defiance that is not breaking a law?

In order to illustrate the difference between the literature focusing on civil disobedience as opposed to that of disobedience behind closed doors, Hannah Arendt’s essay ‘Civil Disobedience’ is a clear indicator of how the two are delineated according to the role of the political as opposed to the subjective. Arendt rejects this possibility of a subjective disobedience that can at once be political, and one that does not rely on the operation in response to law (Loizidou 2013). In her 1970 essay, Arendt defended the rights of American citizens to dissent from unjust laws and policies of the American nation, allowing for a theory describing two recourses to rebellion to law. Arendt made a distinction between civil disobedience and conscientious objection, the former being resistance undertaken collectively, and the latter the expression of individual sedition: ‘... whenever the jurists attempt to justify the civil disobedient on moral and legal grounds, they construe his case in the image of either the conscientious objector or the man who tests the constitutionality of statute’ (Arendt 1970: 55; Smith 2010: 152). Arendt makes the division between the public and the private obvious, to the extent that to be a conscientious objector is to be acting in a non-political capacity, whilst rejecting the moral and legal characterisations of civil disobedience very much in favour of the
political (Smith 2010: 152). There is a boundary between the two, the conscientious objector as not she who will test the statute to change the statute, Arendt understanding this as a respite of conscience on behalf an individual and not that of a shared enterprise. A conscientious objector is therefore performing an admirable but very idiosyncratic and self-interested action (Smith 2010: 152), whereby one listens to a ‘soundless dialogue between me and myself’ in order to quell inner concerns and speak to one’s conscience (Arendt 1970: 63). Arendt appears somewhat critical of the conscientious objector in that the protester panders to their integrity, whereby one is more interested in the self than the world in a retreat from the effects of injustice through disassociation. This does nothing to remove injustice, which is what civil disobedience hopes to do (Arendt 1970: 60–1).

The line between conscientious objection and civil disobedience is indeed fine, as Socrates has also been categorised, alongside Thoreau and Gandhi as an exponent of ‘conscientious law breaking.’ According to Gans, the difference between civil disobedience and conscientious objection is: ‘Civil disobedience is disobedience intended to attain a change in the policy or the principle served or expressed by the law being disobeyed or by another law. Conscientious objection is disobedience of more modest intent: that of saving the disobeyer’s conscience’ (Gans 1992: 138). Therefore, and following from an Arendtian conception of civil disobedience, to be civilly disobedient is to effect and affect law through extra-legal action, to speak and hold hands in the realm of the political: ‘… the law can indeed stabilise and legalise change once it has occurred, but the change itself is always the result of extra-legal action’ (Arendt 1970: 80). Thus, at the same time as being a political action and performance, it is also by its nature that which require numbers, whereby civilly disobedient citizens are ‘… organised minorities, bound together by common opinion, rather than by common interest, and the decision to take a stand
against the government’s policies’ (Arendt 1970: 56). Arendt highlights how civil disobedience should occur through a joining oneself to others, thereby making civil disobedience a collective event and distancing it from a singular transgression of conscience. Without civil disobedience, it is argued that democracy suffers, and indeed Arendt sees its role as foundational to constitutionalism, as an institution in itself. Without the impetus of direct action governments become less democratic and thus this extra-legal performance is that which resides at the heart of law and the rule of law (Hall 1971: 3).

Civil disobedience also characterises itself as that which can be justified, as it is an act which seeks emancipation from unjust laws. Gandhi defined civil disobedience as ‘civil breach of unmoral statutory enactments’, whereby protest is directly against ‘... laws which are themselves unjust’ (Woozley 1976: 24). The justification for illegal action is thus a repudiation of injustice in the form of normativity. According to Fung, there are certain principles that should govern the deliberative democrats’ choice of political action: fidelity, charity, exhaustion, and proportionality: ‘The principle of fidelity states the normative and empirical commitments of the deliberative activist. He has two principle loyalties, and takes both as falsifiable propositions. The first loyalty goes to the method of deliberation’ (Fung 1980: 402). This validation of the right to civil disobedience is couched in terms of ‘... the conditions under which revolution would, if ever, be justified’ (Brown 1961: 669). According to Brown, there is an aporia within which law does recognise the need for rebellion to law, implying the possibility of a ‘legally permitted case of lawbreaking’. For if civil disobedience, which is lawbreaking, can be justified, then surely the law ought to permit it where justified (1961: 671).
This mentioning of a fidelity and a loyalty resonates when discussing Burroughs shortly, in his devotion to his addiction and his disobedient way of being. It also speaks to a form of political obedience, for if there is disobedience then there are the limits of obedience which the dis, disallows. In the eyes of Étienne de la Boétie’, the tyranny of state rule is that it is based on popular acceptance, an acquiescence to our own subjection, and this is the only way in which the state can exist (Rothbard 2007: 7). The mystery of civil obedience, is therefore consent: ‘I should like merely to understand how it happens so many men, so many villages, so many cities, so many nations, sometimes suffer under a single tyrant who has no other power than the power they give them; who is able to harm them only to the extent to which they have the willingness to bear him; who could do them absolutely no injury unless they preferred to put up with him rather than contradict him’ (de la Boétie’ in Rothbard 2007: 9). De la Boétie’ believed there to be a mass call for disobedience stemming from two premises, consent and emancipation, whereby all that is needed for injustice to be overcome is to withdraw consent. Indeed, what has ‘... so, denatured man that he, the only creature really born to be free, lacks the memory of his original condition and the desire to return to it?’ (de la Boétie’ in Rothbard 2007: 9). Echoing de la Boétie’, is a philosophical anarchism which sees the duty to obey the law as a surrender of moral autonomy, whereby the denial of the duty to obey would be seen as a critical anarchism (Gans 1992: 2), and yet no matter what there is a gradient to the levels to which law is and can be (justifiably) opposed. Under certain conditions the law is to be disobeyed or obeyed; according to justification, there is a limited obedience and absolute obedience (Gans, 1992: 132).

How justifiable is naughtiness in this sense? Having outlined civil disobedience and conscious objection in terms of seeking to alter the status quo, use of non-violence and direct illegal
response to unjust laws, how applicable is this to a consideration of the manner and practice of naughtiness? And what role does obedience have in this understanding and our discussion of Burroughs’ writing practices? Before moving on to his cut-up technique and the space of The Interzone, the role of forgiveness and justification in naughtiness should be discussed.

**Naughtiness, Authority, Forgiveness**

What is the role of authority in naughtiness? And what role does conscience have to play, is it one that replicates the retreat of the conscientious objector? Naughtiness and disobedience are analogous in the presence of guilt. With disobedience that is justified there is no guilt. With naughtiness that is led by justice, there may be the presence of guilt and the need to be absolved: ‘The experience of a sense of guilt for wrong-doing is necessary for the development of self-control. The guilt feelings will later serve as a warning signal which [...] can [be] produce[d] [...] [when] an impulse to repeat the naughty act comes over’ (Fraiberg 1968: 246). Law’s response to naughtiness is a state of confused permissiveness. To be naughty is not to be caught, to pacify and manipulate law, for naughty’s end. On some levels, naughtiness operates on a plateau of dishonesty, but there is a conscious and wilful objection that allows for one’s conscience to cease from shifting from naughty to the next stage.

If civil disobedience can be justified then is naughtiness unjustifiable? And if it is not justified, is it forgivable? Of course Derrida would say that the only thing that calls for pardoning is the unpardonable: ‘...forgiveness forgives only the unforgivable. One cannot, or should not, forgive; there is only forgiveness, if there is any, where there is the unforgivable. That is to say that forgiveness must announce itself as impossibility itself. It can only be possible in doing the
impossible’ (Derrida 1997: 33). Naughtiness is defined not by the absence of law, but by its very presence, and the gap that lies in between preaching and practicing, what ought and what is. It is law that forgives naughtiness, like in the case of Burroughs and his expensive lawyer. Naughtiness is guilty, and the most unforgiveable act because it is forgiven by law. Thus, it is at the same time the most political act, the most wilful and deliberate deviation from a norm. Naughtiness, is thus forgivable, because of the individual asking to be forgiven and their relation to the law. Your sins always find you out – or, if you are naughty, you remain undetected with only law itself keeping your secret. To be naughty depends on who you are, and who you are in relation to law. Think of Burroughs and the death of his wife and ‘naughty as forgivable’ will resonate; because of his weighty reputation, his family, and a weighty wallet, he got away with the crime of crimes.

In terms of Arendt’s understanding of civil disobedience, there has to be a seeking to alter established norms as well as the direct effecting of the statute, to use her turn of phrase. The disobedience should also be civil, in the sense of a non-violence. Naughtiness should always be non-violent, given that it is a playful enterprise, however it is clumsy, and may have the most unforgivable of consequences (the death of Burroughs’ wife). Naughtiness is less about altering norms than finding a space where new norms and their deviations can reside, within the given structures of the overarching legal culture. The statute does not change, but a new non-statute is created, a new infra-law or hidden transcript affects itself in response to the presence of law. There is a form of an auto-immune tolerance practiced by law that allows the space for naughtiness. In the same sense, Burroughs understands that control operates paradoxically: ‘...on the one hand, its tendency is toward absolute control, while on the other, it requires the uncontrolled as the point of its intervention, causing control to virtualise the social field through
constant variations of the latter’ (Burroughs in Grauerholz and Silverberg 1998: 46). In the same way critiquing creates alternative passages, so too naughtiness introduces this novelty external to law of which Arendt speaks.

Burroughs replicates naughtiness within his aesthetic through the cut-up technique and his descriptions of the ‘Interzone’. Arguably, Burroughs creates this space for naughtiness through The Interzone, whilst creates tools, strategies and performances of naughtiness through the exemplar of the cut-up technique. First will be discussed these tools, followed by the third space of naughtiness, the nought, The Interzone.

**Burroughs’ Naughty Writing Practices: The Cut Up**

As has been well-documented, a central concept within his work has been ‘control’, Burroughs being stated in Nathan Moore’s ‘Nova Law’, ‘... as one of the most fundamental diagnosticians of the 20th century [in] the role of power and beyond’ (Moore 2007: 436). ‘Dis’, its etymology and history, is a prefix that is present within Burroughs’ work within many forms, but not one so obvious as his writing technique. To dissemble, to take apart, to cut up. The cut-up technique was a reaction to the omnipotence of control, whether through narcotics laws or control relating to his sexuality. By cutting up, he diluted control and dismembered the relations between words and images, prevalent in his work from Naked Lunch onwards. Moore relays the problem of control as how to convince people to comply to norms - to cut up is to divert the predictability created by the norm. By cutting up, the gap between what happens and should happen, is revealed (Moore 2007: 445). Cutting up, dising, exposes the effects of control, and by freeing the words, Burroughs profanes. He is putting back that which had been taken away
by law, as Agamben would agree: ‘... if ‘to consecrate’ (sacrare) was the term that indicated the removal of things from the sphere of human law, ‘to profane’ meant, conversely, to return them to the free use of men’ (Agamben, 2007: 73).

Relating this to naughty, Moore’s discussion on control and law’s predictability, indicate that which naughtiness seeks to subvert. By cutting up, one is taking the law by surprise, and creates moments of unforeseeability. The repetition of an act is not naughty, but the more one repeats, the more one becomes a law to one’s self, the more one operates predictably, and naughtiness transforms to another phenomena. As is evident in this quote from American children’s books writer Lauren Ingalls Wilder: ‘Once you begin being naughty, it is easier to go and on and on, and sooner or later something dreadful happens’. Once something dreadful happens, then naughty disappears and another form of obedience to the act takes place. Naughty is not even obedient to itself, naughtiness is a law unto itself, it exists as a relation, a way of being that allows subjects of law consciously detract the effects of law's decisions and consequences. Naughty is a tactic as much as law is. Burroughs’ use of the cut-ups is this way of dodging law, unstable and unrecognisable performances that confuse law, confuse the text, the grammar of writing and ultimately of legality as a whole. Despite this, in his life, perhaps Burroughs steps too far with his obedience to his addictions, allowing for the tragic shooting of his wife, and the predictable laying down of the law. Nevertheless, he still was not convicted for his the results of his ungainly and inebriated deviance.

**Burroughs’Naughty Space: The Interzone**
Burroughs’ Interzone is his space where nothingness (nought/naughty) resides, where nothingness can be practiced. In his writings, The Interzone is manifest in two ways – as a zone in Tangiers, and as the zone he descends into during his junk sickness (being without heroin).

The first definition of The Interzone is thus a place, an international zone, it is where he went to recover from his junk sickness and recuperate on ‘apomorphine’ during the ‘50s. This international zone is Tangier, where, he says, East meets West coming round the other way (Burroughs in Grauerholz and Silverberg 1998: 162). This is the exceptional zone where, according to Burroughs, ‘Tangier is one of the few places left in the world where, so long as you don’t proceed to robbery, violence, or some form of crude, antisocial behaviour, you can do exactly what you want. It is a sanctuary of non-interference’ (1998: 128). It is here where there are no judgements, there are not those who wish to assert their normality, just like Burroughs’ comfort with rural life: ‘There’s no law in this town, son. Nearest sheriff is twenty miles from here and keeps his distance’ (Burroughs in Grauerholz and Silverberg 1998). At the same time it is the most condemned place on earth: ‘All houses in the city are joined. Houses of sod ... the City is visited by epidemics of violence, and the untended dead are eaten by vultures in the streets. Albinos blink in the sun. Boys sit in trees, languidly masturbate. People eaten by unknown diseases watch passers-by with evil, knowing eyes’ (1998: 162).

The second definition of the The Interzone is also the point at which Burroughs describes breaking from heroin, which simultaneously is at the point at which the drug deems itself most powerful. It is a precisely that, an interzone, the world between human will and its negation: ‘... The point at which, in the absence of the drug, speech at all becomes possible, but correlatively, the point at which the drive toward resumed addiction is at its strongest’ (Burroughs, 1997,
It is a movement in between two ways of being, a space between two practices. This is where Burroughs resides when withdrawing from heroin, he is not within the world of norms, he is ‘The Invisible Man’: ‘Possession’ they call it, writes Burroughs. ‘As if I was usually there but subject to goof now and again … Wrong! I am never here …’ (Burroughs in Grauerholz and Silverberg 1998: 169). He is nought, he is Not-I, he is Not-the-Messiah.

Interzone is a space inside and outside nothing, a little like naughtiness. It is perhaps a zone in which, for a change, Burroughs feels he actually has effect, he exists, yet he is a ‘shadow’ (past), something that wishes to announce itself. The Interzone is the presence of the absence of his own shadow, a place where Avery Gordon would say, ‘… interstices of the factual and the fabulous […] the place where the shadow and the act converge’ (Gordon, 2010: 197). Within the life of ‘The Johnsons’, (the Johnsons being decent law-abiding citizens), Burroughs is always the deviant. He is immediately excluded by normality’s need to be right and to impose rightness on others (Hume, 1888: 124). He remembers: ‘And a hotel clerk in Tunis; I handed him some money to put in the safe. He put the money away and looked at me: ‘You do not need a receipt Monsieur.’ I looked at him and saw that he was a Johnson, and knew that I didn’t need a receipt’ (Hume, 1888: 124). Outside of The Interzone, Burroughs is always the one who watches from the exterior as that who feels the intensity of observation the most; the one who is excluded and experimented upon by the creators of vacuity, and yet he does not see the need for barriers and walls: ‘Of course there is always the possibility of reckless breakthrough, carrying a pistol around and shooting anyone who annoys me … even that would require some signal from outside, or from deep inside that it comes to the same thing. I have always seen inside as outside as a false dichotomy. There is no sharp line of separation’ (1998, 129). Within The
Interzone, Burroughs feels the strength of his drugs, the strength of the law, the most, compelling him to act in a certain way, allowing him the space to do so.

Thus, The Interzone is the space in which the power of both disobedience and obedience meet. It is the gap between what happens and should happen, infecting neither, but acts as a signifier of law's existence. It is an *amor fati*, an anarchic affirmation of life. To be nothing, to be within The Interzone, the residue of something most powerful when it is 'Noch Nicht' (Bloch, 1996).

Having discussed the practice (cut-up) and space (Interzone) of naughtiness in terms of a Burroughsian language, it would be useful to note at this point that the performance itself of naughtiness is this space, in a Lefebvrian understanding of productive space (Lefebvre 1991). Thus the two combined are part of the performance of naughtiness, in the presence of the performance of law and disobedience.

**Naughtiness as The Interzone: A Space between Law and Disobedience**

Socrates sits with Burroughs and resides between law and disobedience, ‘having refused to obey the law abridging his freedom of speech but also refusing to evade the law by escaping from Athens, he peacefully drank the hemlock’ (Martin, 1970: 21). It is an in betweenness, the evasive nature of pinpointing naughtiness is indicative of its function and form as a way of being, and as a way of acting. It seems as though naughtiness comes from an indescribable ‘nought’ (hinting to its etymology), a space of compromise, or somewhere in between.
Naughtiness has a refusal of definition and cogent form, but it is always defined by that which it is not. To be nought, nothing, to exist in relation to something else, in a stasis between ways of being; within The Interzone, is to exist as a dis-ontology and a profaning freedom within bounds, the residue of something most powerful when it is Noch Nicht, a form of 'Not-Yet-Consciousness': ‘Every age contains its horizon, its Front over which this Not-Yet-Consciousness flows when the block of static and regressive thinking is lifted’ (Bloch 1996: 5). A horizon depicts a line of departure where the unknown begins, although it is the unrequited horizons of the past that he combines with the immanent potentiality of the now. According to Bloch, to delve into the uncharted is to enact this ontology of venturing beyond, that of the 'Not-Yet' (Bloch 1996: 13). It is a mechanism of immanence that sees no distance within the distance that is there, a lack of postponement through delay (Bloch 1996: 16). Thus Bloch would see naughtiness as a transgressive mode, as the movements and performances of The Interzone and the cut-ups as those methods of breaking free from a pre-destined horizon, that of law, and emerging with the potentiality of something new and unforeseen.

**Naughtiness, Obedience and Time**

In the form of naughtiness, it is the manner in which we are not obedient, the way in which authority enters daily life by our proactive denial of its presence. It is a practical and vernacular form of resistance to law. Naughtiness places itself in The Interzone of law and resistance, drawing the boundaries of the limits of Law and Disobedience by creating a third space for a (very subjective) political subjectivity. The denial of any duty to obey the law is one that is one that opens out this Interzone, it is the duty to obey the law as not something that is an absolute duty (Gans, 1992: 120). Disobedience relies upon justification, naughtiness relies on
forgiveness, because the law may not always be unjust. In the case of Burroughs, he is obedient to his disobedience, he is impelled and compelled through a fidelity to the event (Badiou 2005). This ‘... borderline between justified and unjustified disobedience will become a slippery slope under the footing of the law as enforcer of desirable conducts, sliding us straight down to anarchy’ (Gans, 1992: 130). This threshold is where naughty resides as a singular account of political subjectivity, that which is neither conscious nor civil, but an ‘unconscious objection’.

Burroughs’ zonal heroin plateau of the Interzone is at once spatial and temporal, just like the performativity of naughtiness. The performance of nought replicates Benjamin’s ‘auratic moments’ where in his ‘Some Motifs in Baudelaire’, he uses the metaphor of a shooting star to describe this auratic phenomena, or the experience of the aura; the ‘unique phenomenon of a distance however close it may be’ (Mosès, 2009: 78). When space embodies time and vice versa, there is an auratic experience, the meeting of the two, where the spark of an original can be seen. Benjamin sees: ‘The sight of a star that goes through thousands of light-years in a flash symbolizes the illumination in which the present suddenly joins the most distant past, or, vice versa, in which the most ancient hope is suddenly embodied in the present instant’ (Mosès 2009: 78).

To create the extra-legal, the space of the nought, that which law relies on, relies on happenings, events, repetition to the point where naughtiness can become another kind of disobedience that unfortuitously kills your beloved wife. The temporality of naughtiness in a Burroughsian loop of cut-ups and interzones hopes to show the subjective nothingness of political disobedience and critique, the source of law and resistance as extra-legal in an Arendtian sense, a way of not-being, a Not-Yet consciousness that is at once a form of obedience as much as dissing.
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